1. You should not make undue haste in the matter of pronouncing divorce: your minor family quarrels should not incline you to pronounce the final divorce in a fit of anger which leaves no chance for reconciliation. However, if you want to divorce your wives, you should divorce them for their prescribed waiting period. Pronouncing divorce for the waiting-period has two meanings and both are implied here:

This is the command which has already been prescribed in Surah al-Baqarah verse 228 above. The waiting period of the married woman who menstruates is three menstrual cycles after the pronouncement of divorce. If this commandment is kept in view, the only appropriate time of pronouncing divorce, so that the waiting-period may duly begin, is when she is not in her menses. Furthermore, this command also requires that the woman should not be divorced in a state of purity during which her husband has had sexual intercourse with her. For a divorce pronounced in this scenario leaves both the husband and wife uncertain whether their sexual union has led to conception or not. Hence, the waiting period cannot start on the assumption that it will be reckoned with reference to future menstrual cycles nor does it cover the waiting period of a pregnant woman. Thus, the above Qur'ānic command lays down two rulings simultaneously:

1. Divorce should not be pronounced during the menstrual cycle.

2. Divorce may be pronounced either in the period of purity during which the couple did not have sexual intercourse, i.e. in a state whereby the woman does not know she is pregnant.

A further consideration of the matter will show that the restrictions imposed on the pronouncement of divorce are for good reasons. The objective behind forbidding divorce during a menstrual cycle is that during this period it is prohibited for the husband and the wife to engage in sexual intercourse. Moreover, during the menstrual cycle, the wife is not temperamentally normal. If there is discord between the couple when the wife is in this state, both the husband and wife are helpless in averting the situation. And if the matter is deferred until the woman is free from her menses, there is the possibility that the woman may return to her normal temperamental state and the mutual attraction that nature has placed between them may also work and reunite them. Likewise, the reason for prohibiting the pronouncement of divorce is that they do not know if their sexual union has led to conception or not. Therefore, it is not a suitable time for pronouncing divorce. Once the husband learns that conception has taken place, he will think twice about divorcing the future mother of his child. Likewise, out of her concern for her baby and her own future, the wife may try her best to remove the cause of her husband's anger. But if a decision is taken blindly, and then it is known that conception had taken place, both will have to regret it later. Also from a medical point of view, it is also confirmed that women are not tempermentally normal during their menses. Therefore, if a quarrel erupts between a husband and wife when she is in this state, both the husband and wife would be helpless to put an end to it.

The above account contains the first meaning of "divorcing women for the prescribed waiting period". It is applicable only to those married women whose marriage is consummated and who menstruate and may possibly conceive. As for its second meaning, it is this: "If you have to divorce your wives, you should divorce them until the expiry of their waiting-period". People are instructed not to pronounce a triple divorce at once which may result in permanent separation. One should pronounce a single or at most double divorce and wait until the end of the waiting period, leaving some chance for reconciliation at any time during this period. Taken in this sense, the above commandment applies to such menstruating women whose marriage has been consummated and also to the post-menopausal women or those who are yet to menstruate or who are found to be pregnant at the time of the pronouncement of divorce. If this Divine Command is followed, one will not be full of regret and remorse after pronouncing divorce. This is because the above mode of divorce has a provision for taking the wife back in wedlock. After the expiry of the waiting period, the separated couple have the option to remarry if they wish to do so.

The same meaning of "divorce them for their prescribed waiting period" has been given by the leading Qur'ānic commentator Ibn 'Abbās who said: "Divorce should not be pronounced during menstruation nor in the period of purity (tuhr) during which the husband has had sexual intercourse with his wife. He should better leave the wife alone until she is pure after her menses, then he may pronounce a single divorce on her. In this case, if there is no reconciliation and the waiting period is over, she would be separated by dint of a single divorce" (Ibn Jarir). The opinion of 'Abdullah ibn Mas'ud on this issue is: "Divorce for the waiting period signifies that one should pronounce the divorce in the period of her purity during which he did have intercourse with her." This interpretation is endorsed by 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar, ‘Aṭā', Mujahid, Maymūn ibn Mihrān, Muqātil ibn Ḥayyān and al-Daḥḥāk (May Allah have mercy on them all) (Ibn Kathīr). However, 'Ikrimah interprets it thus: "Divorce should be pronounced when it is known that she is pregnant. One should not divorce her after having sexual intercourse with her when it is uncertain whether she is pregnant or not" (Ibn Kathir). Both al-Hasan al-Baṣrī and Ibn Sirin are of the opinion that: "Divorce should be pronounced either in the [wife's] state of purity during which he has not had intercourse with her, or when her pregnancy is established" (Ibn Jarir).

The intention of this verse was best explained by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) himself when 'Abdullāh ibn 'Umar divorced his wife while she was still in her menses. The details of this incident have been reported in almost all the collections of Ḥadīth and serve as the source of all the relevant legal rulings. When 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar divorced his wife during her menses, Umar went to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and mentioned to him what his son had done. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) expressed great displeasure and said to 'Umar: "Ask him to take her back and keep her as his wife until she is pure and then has another monthly cycle and becomes pure again. Then if he wants to divorce her, let him do so when she is pure and he has not had any sexual intercourse with her. This is the waiting period which God Most High has prescribed for divorcing women. In another narration, these words are added: "Either you divorce her in her state of purity during which you did not have sexual intercourse with her or when her pregnancy becomes fully known."

Other Prophetic traditions shed further light on the meaning of this verse. These reports are ascribed to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and some leading Companions. Al-Nasa'ī narrates that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was informed that someone had pronounced triple divorces on his wife in one sitting. This made one should not exceed one single pronouncement and wait until the waiting period is over."

In the light of the above Prophetic sayings and traditions and the above mentioned Qur'ānic verse under study, Muslim jurists have devised an elaborate law of divorce, which is reproduced below:

1. The Ḥanafīs divide divorce into three different kinds: More Adequate (Aḥsan), Adequate (Hasan) and Blameworthy Innovated (Bid 'i). The more adequate form of divorce (Aḥsan) refers to that divorce in which a man divorces his wife during her state of purity (tuhr) during which he has not had sexual intercourse with her, and leaves her to complete her waiting period. As for the adequate form of divorce (Hasan), it is that in which a man pronounces one divorce in each period of purity. In this case, the pronouncement of a triple divorce, one in each of the three periods of purity is not contrary to the Sunnah. However, the best approved method is to pronounce only one single divorce and leave the wife to complete her waiting period. The blameworthy innovated form of divorce (Bid'ī) is that in which a man pronounces a triple divorce in one single sitting, or pronounces three different divorces at different times during the same period of purity, or pronounces the divorce during his wife's menstruation, or divorces her in that period of purity when he has had sexual intercourse with her. Whoever commits any of the above acts has committed a sin. The above command pertains to the woman with whom marriage has been consummated and has regular menses. As for the woman whose marriage has not been consummated, she could be divorced both in her state of purity and also during her menstruation, and both of which will be in accordance with the Sunnah. As for the woman whose marriage is consummated but who is post-menopause, or is yet to menstruate, she can be divorced even after having sex with her because there is no chance of her being pregnant; but if the woman is pregnant, she can also be divorced even after intercourse with her for her pregnancy is already established. According to the Sunnah, divorce may be pronounced on the above three types of women after a gap of one month each. However, the more adequate form of divorce is that in which only one divorce is pronounced and the woman is left to complete her waiting period (al-Hidāyah, Fatḥ al-Qadir, Aḥkām al-Qur'ān of al-Jaṣṣās and 'Umdat al-Qārī).

According to Imām Mālik, too, divorce is of three kinds: According to the Sunnah (Sunni), blameworthy innovative which is offensive (Bid'ī Makruh) and blameworthy innovative which is forbidden (Bid'ī Ḥarām). The type of divorce which is in accordance with the Sunnah is that the woman whose marriage is consummated and menstruates is divorced only once during her period of purity during which the husband has not had sex with her and she is left until she completes her waiting period. The blameworthy innovative divorce which is offensive is that which is pronounced during the wife's period of purity during which her husband has had sex with her, or that in which more than one divorce is pronounced on her while she is in her period of purity during which no sexual intercourse has happened, or that in which three divorces are pronounced, one each in separate periods of her purity within the waiting period. And the blameworthy innovative divorce which is forbidden is that in which divorce is pronounced during the wife's menstruation (Hashiyat al-Dasūqī 'alā al-Sharḥ al-Kabir and Ibn al-'Arabi, Aḥkām al-Qur'an).

The authentic opinion of Imām Aḥmad ibn Hanbal which is generally endorsed by the Ḥanbali jurists is as follows: A woman whose marriage is consummated and who menstruates, the approved method of divorce according to the Sunnah is to pronounce divorce upon her in her period of purity without having had sex with her during that period and then let her complete the waiting period. However, if she is given three divorces, one each at different times, in three separate periods of purity, or a triple divorce, one each in three separate periods of purity, or a triple divorce in one and the same period of purity, or she is divorced during her menses, or divorced in her period of purity during which the husband has had sexual intercourse with her and her pregnancy is not known, all these cases are disapproved and forbidden forms of divorce. But if her marriage is not consummated or if her marriage is consummated and she is in her post-menopausal state, pregnant or does not menstruate, the time of divorce or its number does not make any difference (al-Insaf fi Ma'rifat al-Rajiḥ min al-Khilaf 'ala Madhhab, Aḥmad ibn Hanbal).

According to Imām al-Shāfi 'ī, the difference between the Sunni form of divorce and the bid'i reprehensible one lies only in the time of pronouncing the divorce and not in its number. For him, divorcing a woman whose marriage is consummated and who menstruates while she is still in her menses, or divorcing a woman during her period of purity when sexual intercourse has not been had with her while she is not known to be pregnant, all these types of divorces are blameworthy innovative (bid'i) and unlawful (ḥarām). As for the number of divorce pronouncements, whether one pronounces a triple divorce or separate divorces in a single period of a wife's purity or in different periods, such actions are not discordant with the Sunnah. Likewise, there is no difference between Sunni and bid'ī divorces with regard to divorcing the woman whose marriage is not consummated or the post-menopausal woman or the woman who is yet to menstruate or the one whose pregnancy is not established (Mughnī al- Muḥtāj). There is no difference in all these cases between the approved and disapproved forms of divorce.

2. Branding a type of divorce as bid'ī, Makruh, ḥarām or sinful by the scholars of the four schools does not mean that such a divorce does not take effect. All the four schools agree that divorce comes into effect, no matter whether it is pronounced during the wife's menses or by way of a triple divorce or when the wife is in her period of purity when her husband has had sex with her, or when her pregnancy is not established or when she is divorced in a way which some scholars consider as a bid'ī divorce. Although divorce becomes effective, the one who resorts to any such forms of divorce is sinful. However, there are some scholars who have reached the rank of ijtihad who differ in this regard with the four Imāms.

Sa'id ibn al-Musayyib and some other immediate followers of the Companions (tābi'ūn) maintain that when divorce is pronounced in a way contrary to the Sunnah, i.e. during the wife's menses or by resorting to a triple divorce, such a divorce does not come into effect at all. The Imamiyyah School (of the Shi'ah) subscribes to this opinion. The basis of this opinion is that, since this form of divorce is prohibited and an instance of an unlawful blameworthy innovation, it is ineffective whereas the Prophetic traditions cited above clearly show that when 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar divorced his wife during her menses, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) asked him to take her back in wedlock. Had this divorce not come into effect, how could he have been asked to take her back in wedlock? It is narrated in many Prophetic traditions that, while the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and leading Companions view as sinful the person who resorts to pronouncing more than one divorce at one time, they did not regard his divorce as void.

Tāwūs and 'Ikrimah hold the view that if a triple divorce is pronounced in one go, only one single divorce comes into force. This very view has been adopted by Imam Ibn Taymiyyah. His opinion draws upon the following report in which Abu'l-Şahbā' asked Ibn 'Abbas: "Do you not know that, during the days of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), Caliph Abū Bakr and the early period of Caliph 'Umar, a triple divorce was regarded as equal to one single divorce?" To which he replied in the affirmative (al-Bukhārī, Muslim). It is reported by Abū Dāwūd and Imam Ahmad that Ibn 'Abbas said: "In the lifetime of Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), and then Caliph Abū Bakr and during the first two years of the reign of Caliph 'Umar, a triple divorce was considered one single divorce. Later on, 'Umar remarked: 'People are acting hastily in a matter which they have been advised to act judiciously and prudently. Why should we not enforce this practice [of considering a triple divorce three divorces at the same time]?' Accordingly, he enforced this."

However, the above opinion is not acceptable for several reasons. In the first place, several reports indicate that Ibn 'Abbas' own ruling was different from the above, as noted earlier. Secondly, this contradicts those sayings of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the leading Companions in which the legal ruling given about triple divorce at one time was considered three divorces which became immediately effective. We have already cited some of these Prophetic sayings above. Thirdly, it appears from Ibn 'Abbās' report that, in an assembly of the Companions, 'Umar had publicly declared the enforcement of triple divorce but the Companions never expressed any differences of opinion neither then nor afterwards. Is it imaginable that 'Umar did something contrary to the Sunnah and all the Companions accepted his decision without saying a word? Moreover, with reference to the story involving Rukānah ibn 'Abd Yazid, Abū Dāwūd, al-Tirmidhi, Ibn Mājah, Imām al- Shāfi 'ī, al-Dārimī and al-Ḥākim narrated a saying which state that, when Rukānah pronounced a triple divorce on his wife in one and the same sitting, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) asked him under oath whether he intended to pronounce a single divorce only (i.e. the remaining two divorces were pronounced only to emphasize the first divorce; that it was not his intention to divorce her thrice in order to secure a permanent separation). When Rukānah gave his solemn oath that he did not intend an irrevocable divorce, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) gave him the right to take his wife back in wedlock. This incident clarifies the issue under discussion well. In the early days, several pronouncements of divorce were considered just one single divorce. Therefore, some interpreters of Ḥadīth have explained the traditions of Ibn 'Abbas thus: as deceit and fraud in religious matters was almost unknown among people in the early period of Islam, the statement of the pronouncer of a triple divorce was admitted as intended to mean a pronouncement of just one single divorce while the two subsequent pronouncements of divorce were used just for emphasis. However, when Caliph 'Umar noted that people hastily resorted to pronouncing three divorces and used the idea of emphasis only as a pretext, he refused to accept their excuse. Imam al-Nawawi and Imām al-Subki consider this to be an excellent interpretation of Ibn Abbas' report. Finally, there is a difference of opinion regarding the statement of Ibn 'Abbās as related by Abu'l-Şahbā'. Muslim, Abū Dāwūd and al-Nasa'i have related another report on the authority of the same Abul-Şahbā' in which it is stated that Ibn 'Abbas stated: "Pronouncing a triple divorce before the consummation of marriage was considered as equivalent to one single divorce in the days of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), Abu Bakr and the early period of the reign of 'Umar." Thus one and the same narrator has reported from Ibn 'Abbās two divergent reports which weakens both narrations.

3. As the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) had commanded the person who divorced his wife while she was in her menstruation to take her back, the dispute has arisen among the jurists regarding the exact meaning of this command. Imām Abū Ḥanifah, Imām al-Shāfi 'ī, Imām Aḥmad, Imām al-Awzā ī, Ibn Abi Layla, Ishāq ibn Rāhawayh and Abū Thawr were of the opinion that such a person will be asked to take back his wife in wedlock but he will not be compelled to do so ('Umdat al-Qārī).

The Hanafi opinion on this issue, as stated in al-Hidayah, is that taking back the wife in wedlock in this case is not only desirable but obligatory. The Shāfi 'ī opinion, as detailed in Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, is that the person who divorces his wife during her menses and does not resort to a triple divorce, the Sunnah demands that he takes her back in wedlock. He should refrain from divorcing her in the next period of purity. But when she has another menstrual cycle, he may divorce her if he wishes to do so. This is recommended in order to ensure that revoking the divorce during her menses may not be taken lightly or in jest. The Hanbali opinion appears in al-Inṣāf thus: "It is preferable for such a person to take his wife back in wedlock." However, Imam Malik and his companions maintain that divorcing during menstruation is a culpable offence. Whether the woman demands it or not, the ruler is obliged to force her husband to take her back in wedlock and continue to press him until the expiry of the waiting period. If he refuses to take her back, he should imprison him. If he still refuses after imprisoning him, he should beat him; and if he still does not yield, the ruler should give his own judgement, saying: "I return your wife to you". And the ruler's decision will be effective after which it would be lawful for the man to have sexual intercourse with the woman, whether he intends to take her back in marriage or not. For the ruler's intention represents his intention (Ḥāshiyat al-Dasūqī). The Mālikīs also hold the view that if the person who has taken his wife back willingly or unwillingly, after divorcing her during menstruation, has made up his mind to repudiate her, the preferable method for him is to refrain from divorcing her in the period of purity that follows the period of menstruation during which he divorced her, and instead divorce her in the period of purity that follows the next menstruation. The prohibition to pronounce divorce in the period of purity, following the menstruation in which divorce was pronounced, has been enjoined so that the return during menstruation does not remain merely verbal, and instead he should have sexual intercourse with the woman during her period of purity. Then, since the pronouncement of divorce in the period of purity in which sexual intercourse has taken place is prohibited, the right time for pronouncing it is the following period of purity (Ḥashiyat al-Dasūqī).

4. As for the period in which one may take back one's wife in wedlock, there is a difference of opinion among the jurists. This disagreement among the jurists stems from their interpretation of the words thalathata quru'in in verse 228 of Surah al-Baqarah: Does it stand for three monthly cycles or three periods of purity? For Imam al-Shafi'i and Imām Mālik qur' refers to a period of purity and this view is held on the authority of 'A'ishah and Zayd ibn Thabit (may Allah be pleased with them). The Ḥanafis on the other hand are of the opinion that qur' refers to menstruation and Imām Aḥmad ibn Hanbal, in his most authentic opinion, agrees with this. This view owes its origin to all the four Rightly- guided Caliphs as well as to 'Abdullah ibn Mas'ud, 'Abdullah ibn 'Abbas, Ubayy ibn Ka'b, Mu'adh ibn Jabal, Abū'l-Dardā', 'Ubadah ibn al-Ṣāmit and Abū Mūsā'l-Ash'arī (may Allah be pleased with them). In al-Muwaṭṭa', Imām Muḥammad cited the following statement by al-Sha 'bi: "I met twelve Companions of the Prophet all of them subscribed to the same opinion." This very view is adopted by most of the Successors (the immediate followers of the Companions, al-Tabi'ūn).

In view of this divergence of opinion, the Shāfi 'īs and Mālikis hold that the woman's waiting period expires immediately after the end of her third menstruation upon which the husband's power to take her back in wedlock is terminated. If the divorce has been pronounced during menstruation, this menstruation will not be counted towards the waiting period. Rather, her waiting period will come to an end as soon as she enters her fourth monthly cycle (Mughni al-Muḥtāj and Ḥāshiyat al-Dasūqi). The Hanafi position is that, when the woman's menses in her third monthly cycle stops after ten days, the waiting period of the woman will come to an end, whether she has a major ritual ablution (ghusl) or not. If the bleeding ceases in less than ten days, her waiting period will not come to an end until she has a major ritual ablution or the time of any complete prayer expires. In case water is not available and she offers the prayer by resorting to dry ablution (tayammum), the husband's right to take her back expires according to Imām Abū Ḥanifah and Imām Abū Yusuf. For Imam Muḥammad, this right will expire as soon as she performs dry ablution (Hidayah). Imām Aḥmad's authentic opinion, which is followed by the majority of Hanbalī jurists, is that the husband's right to take her back in wedlock will remain as long as the woman does not have a major ritual ablution after her third menstrual cycle (al-Inṣāf).

5. There is consensus among the jurists that if a person pronounces a revocable divorce, he may take his wife back in wedlock at any time before the expiry of her waiting period, irrespective of her consent for the Qur'an specifically says: "Should their husbands desire reconciliation during this time, they are entitled to take them back into wedlock" (Surah Al-Baqarah, 2: 228). From this, it can automatically be concluded that, until the expiry of the waiting period, the marriage contract remains intact and the husband can take his wife back before they are separated. In other words, taking the wife back does not require a renewal of marriage for which the woman's consent is essential for re-marriage. Apart from this much agreement, the jurists hold different opinions about the method of taking the wife back.

According to the Shāfi 'īs, the return can happen only verbally, not by action. If the husband does not pronounce that he has taken his wife back, sexual intercourse or acts of intimacy, even if performed with the intention of resuming marital relationship, will not be sufficient for the resumption of their relationship. In this case, seeking any kind of enjoyment from the woman is unlawful (ḥarām) even if it is without sexual desire. However, there is no objection in having sexual intercourse with the woman who has been divorced revocably, for the scholars are not agreed on its being unlawful. However, the ones who believe in its unlawfulness believe in its being punishable. Furthermore, according to the Shafi'i opinion, it is incumbent to pay a proper or customary dower (mahr mithal) if the husband has had sexual intercourse with the wife he had divorced revocably, whether he takes her back verbally or not (Mughnī al-Muḥtāj).

The Māliki opinion is that taking her back may be done through both word and deed. If for the purpose of resumption of marriage by word of mouth, the husband uses express words, the resumption will take place whether he intended it or not, or even if he has uttered express words of resuming the marriage as a joke, his words would still amount to a resumption of marriage. But if his words are not express, they would be considered a resumption of marriage only in case they were pronounced with the intention of marriage resumption. As for the resumption of marriage by conduct, no act, whether it is an act of intimacy or sexual intercourse, can be considered a resumption of marriage as long as it has not been performed with the intention of marriage resumption (Hashiyat al-Dasūqī and Ibn al-'Arabī, Aḥkām al-Qur'ān).

The Hanafi and Hanbali stance on the issue is the same as that of the Mālikīs. As for the resumption of marriage by conduct, the legal ruling of both schools, in contradistinction to the Mālikīs, is that if the husband has sexual intercourse with the woman whom he has divorced revocably within the waiting period, this by itself would amount to a resumption of marriage, whether it was his intention of resuming the marriage or not. However, the difference between the opinions of the two schools is that, according to the Ḥanafis, any act of intimacy amounts to a resumption of marriage even if it is a lesser degree than sexual intercourse. The Hanbalis, however, do not consider a mere act of intimacy a resumption of marriage (al-Hidayah, Fath al-Qadir, 'Umdat al-Qārī and al-Insaf).

6. As for the consequences of divorce which is according to the Sunnah (al-ṭalāq al-sunnī) and the blameworthy innovative divorce (al-talaq al-bid'i), the difference is as follows: In the case of one or two pronouncements of divorce, even if the waiting period has expired, the divorced woman and her former husband can re-marry, if they mutually agree on this. But if the man has pronounced a triple divorce, the resumption of marriage is neither possible within the waiting period nor after its expiry unless she marries someone else and the marriage is duly contracted and consummated. And then, only after her second husband divorces her or dies can the woman and her former husband remarry if they wish to do so by mutual consent. In a tradition found in most Ḥadith collections which is supported by an authentic chain of narrators it is reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was asked about this issue: "If someone pronounces a triple divorce on his wife and then that woman marries another person and the two have intimate contact without sexual intercourse, can that woman remarry her former husband if the second husband divorces her?" To this the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) replied: “No, not until her second husband enjoys her just as the first husband did." As for conniving an arranged marriage to make it lawful for the first husband to remarry the wife he divorced a triple divorce through marrying another man and divorcing her after having sexual intercourse with her (taḥlīl), this is invalid in the opinion of Imam Abū Yūsuf. According to Imām Abū Ḥanifah, such an arrangement will no doubt make her lawful for her former husband but it is a highly reprehensible rather unlawful act. 'Abdullah ibn Mas'ud reports that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said that Allah has cursed the parties involved in such an act, both the temporary new husband (muḥallil) and also the person for whom the marriage is made lawful again (muḥallal lah) (al-Tirmidhī and al-Nasā'ī, Kitāb al-Nikāḥ, 1119).

'Uqbah ibn 'Amir related that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) asked his Companions: "Should I not inform you about who is the bull on rent?" When they asked him to clarify, he said: "It is the one who who makes marriage lawful again [after being made unlawful through a triple divorce or three different divorces]. God's curse falls upon both the man who makes such marriage lawful again (muḥallil) and also the one for whom the marriage is made lawful again (muḥallal lah)” (Ibn Mājah, Kitāb al-Nikah, 1926 and al-Dāraquṭnī).

2. This command is addressed to both men and women as well as to all members of their families. What is meant is that people should not take divorce as a sport for it is a grave matter which gives rise to many legal questions for the husband, wife, their children and the people of their household. Since divorce is a very sensitive issue with legal bearings for the man, women, their children and the people of their family, the date and time of pronouncing it must be recorded, along with the menstrual state of the wife when divorce was pronounced, the exact time when her waiting period commenced and when it expired. This is because these are crucial issues in the husband's exercise of his right to take his wife back in wedlock, for her stay in the house, for her maintenance allowance, for their mutual rights as husband and wife, for when the woman is separated from him finally and when she can have the right to remarry. And if this case takes the shape of a law-suit, in order to arrive at the correct decision, the court will also need to know the correct date and time of pronouncing the divorce and the women's state of purity at the time. For, without this vital information, no court can give the right decision on the issues arising from the divorce of the woman whose marriage may or may not have been consummated, who may or may not be pregnant, who may or may not be menstruating and who may or may not be taken back in wedlock and who may have been divorced revocably or irrevocably.

3. The husband should not turn out the wife out of his home in anger nor should the woman herself leave the house in a fit of anger or haste. The house is hers and she should stay there until the expiry of her waiting period. The husband and the wife should live in the same house together. This may provide a way out for reconciliation which will benefit both. In the case of a revocable divorce, the husband may be attracted towards her at any time. Likewise, the wife may win him over by removing the root cause of his anger and disagreement. Such opportunities may arise if the couple stay in the same house. In three months, or until three monthly cycles, or until the delivery of the baby if she is pregnant, they may have an ample opportunity for reconciliation. If the husband hastily turns her out of the house, or if she imprudently leaves for her parents' home, little room will remain for reconciliation and taking her back in wedlock. In this case, even a revocable divorce may lead to separation. This is why the jurists have even suggested that the woman who is divorced a revocable divorce should adorn herself properly so that her husband may be attracted to her (al-Hidayah and al-Inṣāf).

The jurists are unanimous on the point that the woman who is divorced a revocable divorce is entitled to accommodation and maintenance during her waiting period. It is not lawful for her to leave her home without her husband's permission nor is it lawful for the husband to turn her out of the house. If he does so, he is sinful. By the same token, if the woman leaves her home on her own accord, not only will she be a sinner but she will also forfeit her entitlement to accommodation and maintenance.

4. "Until they have committed a manifestly evil deed" (verse 1 of Surah al-Talaq) has been interpreted variously by the jurists. For

al-Hasan al-Başrī, ‘Amir al-Sha'bi, Zayd ibn Aslam, al-Daḥḥāk, Mujāhid, 'Ikrimah, Ibn Zayd, Ḥammad and al-Layth, the reference here is to sexual misconduct. However, Ibn 'Abbās said that it means the use of abusive language. In other words, it refers to the woman who does not control her tongue even after being divorced and continues quarrelling and misbehaving with her husband and the members of his family. According to Qatãdah, it means nushūz (rebellion against her husband). What is meant is that the wife is divorced because of rebelling against her husband and persists in doing so even during the waiting period. 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar, al-Suddi, Ibn al-Ṣā'ib and Ibrāhīm al-Nakha 'ī, say that it refers to the woman who leaves the marital home of her own accord. For them, her leaving the home during the waiting period amounts to committing a manifest indecency. "Do not abuse others except in case you wish to be known as a discourteous person." According to the first three of these four viewpoints, "except in case" is linked with "do not turn them out of their houses", and the sentence means that if a woman is guilty of sexual misconduct, foul language or rebellion, it is fine to turn her out of her home. The sentence also admits the meaning that if she leaves by her own accord, she has committed a manifestly evil deed.

5. This part of the verse refutes the opinion of those who think that pronouncing divorce during menstruation, or after a triple divorce in one instance, does not constitute a divorce at all. Likewise, it also proves wrong those who regard triple divorce as equal to one single divorce. The question arises if a blameworthy innovative divorce (bidi'i) did not come into force, or if a triple divorce was equal to one single revocable divorce, the Qur'an would not have said: "And he who transgresses the bounds set by God commits a wrong against himself.

You do not know: maybe God will cause something to happen to pave the way (for reconciliation)" (verse 1 of Surah al-Ṭalāq). These two things would be meaningful if some harm is caused by divorcing in a way which is discordant with the Sunnah and which makes one remorseful. The pronouncement of a triple divorce in one sitting rules out any chance of reconciliation. Otherwise, the Qur'an would not have referred to transgressing the bounds set by Allah which may be regarded as doing wrong for oneself. In the case of a revocable divorce, there is always room for reconciliation. Thus, there was no need to say: "Maybe Allah will cause something to happen to pave the way for retaining her in marriage (reconciliation)" (Surah al-Talaq, verse 1).

Here, one should again understand well the mutual relationship between verses 228 and 230 of Surah al-Baqarah and the verses in Surah al-Talaq. In Surah al-Baqarah mention is made of the pronouncement of three divorces. After pronouncing the first two, one retains the right to take one's wife back and re-marry her without resorting to making one's wife lawful again through marrying someone else (taḥlīl) after the expiry of the waiting period. Once one pronounces divorce for the third time, one forfeits both these rights. The verses under study of Surah al-Talaq do not amend or abrogate the command mentioned in Surah al-Baqarah. Rather, they aim to instruct people how to use wisely the powers that they have been given to divorce their wives. If the husband were to exercise this right properly, homes would be saved from ruin and the husband may feel remorse after pronouncing the divorce. For this provides him ample opportunities for reconciliation and, even if separation happens, they will still have a chance to get married again as a last resort if the couple wish to do so. But if the husband uses these powers unwisely, or in a wrong way, he would only be damaging himself and wasting all the opportunities for making amend. This may be likened to the following parable: if a father gives his son three-hundred rupees, authorising him to spend as he wills, yet he advises him to spend it piece-meal and at the right place and to earn maximum profit by it. Now, if he acts against his advice and spends it carelessly in the wrong places and squanders it or spends all of it in one go and incurs loss, this will harm him and he will not get any more money from his father. This advice would be meaningless if the father never put the amount of money in his son's possession to start with, for in that case there would be no need to give this kind of advice?

6. If one pronounces divorce once or twice, one should decide before the expiry of the waiting period whether one wants to keep one's wife in wedlock or separate from her. If one intends to keep her, then one should keep her with honour and dignity and not with a view to tormenting and harassing her or to getting another opportunity to prolong her waiting period by divorcing her once again. And if one decides to part with her, then one should part with her gracefully without indulging in any quarrel or vilification. If one still owes her the dower or any remaining part of it, one must pay it off and give her some gift according to one's means as enjoined in verse 241 of Surah al-Baqarah. (For further details, see: Tafhim al-Qur'ān (TUQ), Sūrah al-Aḥzāb, 33: n. 86).

7. According to Ibn 'Abbas, it implies calling two witnesses for both divorce and reconciliation (Ibn Jarīr). When 'Imran ibn Husayn was asked about someone who had divorced his wife and then retained her in marriage without taking any witness for either of his two actions, he remarked: "He did both actions contrary to the Sunnah. Take witnesses for both divorcing one's wife and taking her back in marriage and do not commit this mistake again in the future" (Abū Dāwūd, Kitāb al- Talaq, 5 and Ibn Majah, Kitāb al-Talaq, 5). However, the jurists of all the four schools agree that taking witnesses for divorce, the resumption of marriage or separation are not prerequisites for the validity of these acts. In the absence of witnesses, these acts come into effect too. Witnesses are an additional precautionary measure so that either party may not deny its occurrence and also in order to facilitate reaching a decision in the case of a dispute, as witnesses help remove all doubts in such cases. This command is similar to the command "But do take witnesses when you settle commercial transactions with one another" (Surah al-Baqarah: verse 282), which does not mean that it is mandatory to have witnesses for every transaction without which a transaction is deemed invalid. It is rather a wise counsel which has been given to eliminate any dispute and it also helps in the long run. In the case of divorce and marriage resumption, the act and conduct of the person are legally valid even without the presence of witnesses. It is simply a precautionary measure that two upright people be taken as witnesses at the time of divorce, or after it, or upon taking back one's wife.

8. It is evident from the wording of the verse that the instructions given above are in the nature of advice and not binding command. If a man pronounces divorce in a way contrary to the Sunnah, as explained above, or fails to record the waiting period accurately, or expels his wife from their home without a good reason, or takes her back at the end of the waiting period only to harass her, or sends her away after a quarrel, and fails to call people to witness the divorce, reconciliation, or separation from her, in all these cases there is no legal implication regarding the divorce, reconciliation or separation themselves. However, acting against God's advice would be proof that his heart is devoid of true faith in God and the Day of Judgement, for this is what prompted him to adopt a course that a true believer would never adopt.

9. It is clear from the context here that fearing God in whatever one does means the following: to pronounce divorce in accordance with the Sunnah; to record accurately the beginning and end of the waiting period; not to drive one's wife out of the marital home; to take one's wife back if one decides to keep her at the expiry of the waiting period with the intention of keeping her equitably; to send her away in a fair manner if one decides to part with her; and to call two reliable men to witness the divorce, reconciliation or separation, as the case may be. In this respect, God declares that He will make a way out of difficulties for him who fears Him. This automatically implies that the person who takes action in the above matters without any fear of God will create for himself complications and difficulties out of which he will not be able to find a way.

Upon reflection on these words, it clearly emerges that those who think that the blameworthy innovative (bidi) form of divorce does not come into effect at all are not correct. Likewise, those who regard the pronouncement of a triple divorce in a single period of purity as a single divorce are not correct because, if the blameworthy form of divorce does not take effect, then how could it create any complication from which one has to find a way out? And if just one single divorce takes place when one has pronounced three divorces at once, then how does the need for a person to seek a way out of a difficulty or complication arise at all?

10. It is no doubt true that it means: "Keeping the divorced wife in the marital home during the waiting period to ensure her maintainance and paying her the dower, or something in surplus, upon her departure, certainly burdens one financially. Spending on a woman whom one has already decided to separate from will surely be irksome and, if the man has limited resources, he will be hit more by this financial burden. But a Godfearing person should endure all this gracefully. God is not niggardly when He provides sustenance to people as they are. And if a person spends his wealth in accordance with God's Law, He will grant him sustenance in a manner that exceeds all his expectations. If one's heart is straitened, let it be so, but God does not give as people do. If a person spends his wealth in accordance with his Law, He will provide for him his sustenace from whence he does not expect.

11. No power can prevent God from enforcing His decree.

12. This is in respect of the women who no longer menstruate and have reached the stage of menopause on account of their age. Their waiting period is reckoned from the day divorce is pronounced on them, and the three months in question represent three lunar months. If she is divorced at the commencement of a lunar month, it is agreed that the waiting period is reckoned from the date of the sighting of the new moon; if she is divorced in the middle of the month, in the opinion of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, it will be taken as a thirty-day month and her waiting-period will have to be completed reckoning each month of thirty days (Badā'i' al-Ṣana'i).

As for the women whose menses are irregular due to some reason, the jurists have held different opinions.

According to Sa'id ibn al-Musayyib, 'Umar had declared that a divorced woman whose monthly cycle stops after one or two days should wait for nine months. If her pregnancy is established, it is fine. Otherwise, she will have to observe another three months waiting period after the passage of those nine months. Only then it becomes lawful for her to marry somebody else.

Ibn 'Abbās, Qatādah and ‘Ikrimah were of the opinion that a woman who did not have menses for a year should observe a three months waiting period.

Tāwūs was of the opinion that a woman who has only one monthly cycle in a year has to observe a waiting period of three monthly cycles. This opinion is also attributed to 'Uthman and ‘Alī and Zayd ibn Thabit (may Allah be pleased with them).

Imām Mālik narrates that a person by the name of Ḥibbān had divorced his wife when she was still suckling a baby. A year passed on but she still did not have her menses. In the meantime, Ḥibbān died and the divorced woman laid claim to a share in his inheritance. The case was brought before 'Uthmān (may Allah be pleased with him) and, upon consulting 'Ali and Zayd ibn Thābit, it was decided that she had indeed a share in the inheritance. The argument given was that she was neither a despaired post-menopausal woman nor one of those girls who are yet to menstruate and, until her husband's death, she was in her menses and had not completed her waiting period.

The Hanafi stance is that the waiting period of the woman who no longer menstruates, but not due to menopause, so that there is no hope of her having it later, would either be known from menstruation, if she has it in the future, or in accordance with the age at which women generally become menopause, and after attaining that age, she will pass three months of the waiting period, after which she will be free from the marriage contract. The same opinion is shared by Imam al- Shafi'i, Imam al-Thawrī, Imam al-Layth as well as 'Alī, 'Uthman and Zayd ibn Thabit (may Allah be pleased with them).

Imam Malik has adopted the ruling of 'Umar and 'Abdullah ibn 'Abbas which is as follows: the woman will first have to wait for nine months. If she does not have her menses during this period, she will spend another three months of the waiting period just like any post- menopausal woman. Explaining the opinion of Imām Mälik, Ibn al- Qāsim said: "The nine months period will be counted from the day she became free from the previous menstrual discharge and not from the day her divorce was pronounced" (All these details have been taken from al-Jaṣṣāṣ's Aḥkām al-Qur'ān and al-Kāsānī's Badā'i' al-Ṣana'i).

According to Imām Aḥmad ibn Hanbal, if a woman's waiting period commences with reference to her menstruation and, if during the waiting period she turns post-menopausal, she will have to observe the waiting period of the menopausal woman and not the woman who menstruates regularly. And if she stops menstruating and the latter's cause is not known, she will first wait for nine months in order to eliminate any chance of pregnancy and then she will have to complete three months of the waiting period. If the reason of the cessation of the menses is known, as for example due to some medical problem or suckling a baby or some other reasons, she will remain within her waiting period until she menstruates and the waiting period will be calculated according to her monthly cycles. The other possibility is that she turns into a post-menopausal woman and she then spends the waiting period prescribed for such menopausal women (al-Inṣāf).

13. They may not have menstruated as yet owing to their young age or because some women menstruate at a very late age and, in rare occasions, they do not have menses at all. In all these instances, the waiting period of post menopausal women is the same as the waiting period of the women who have stopped menstruating, i.e. three months from the day when divorce is pronounced.

Let it be clear that, according to the explanations of Qur'ānic commentators, this relates to the woman who had sexual intercourse with her husband, for there is no waiting period for the woman who is divorced before the consummation of marriage (Surah al-Aḥzāb, 33: 49). Therefore, mentioning the waiting period of girls who have not yet menstruated clearly proves that it is not only permissible to give away the girl in marriage at this age but it is also permissible for the husband to consummate the marriage with her. It goes without saying that no Muslim has the right to forbid a thing which the Qur'an has held as permissible.

As for the girl who is divorced when she has not yet menstruated and then starts her menses during her waiting period, her waiting period will start with effect from her monthly cycle and her waiting period will be reckoned just like the woman who menstruates regularly.

14. All scholars unanimously agree that the waiting period for a divorced pregnant woman is the period until she delivers. But there is a difference of opinion regarding whether the same also applies to the woman whose husband dies during her pregnancy. The difference of opinion has arisen because, in Surah al-Baqarah (verse 234), the waiting period of the woman whose husband dies has been stipulated as four months and ten days, and there is no mention whether this injunction applies to all widows generally or only to those who are not pregnant.

On reading the relevant verses together, 'Ali and 'Abdullah ibn 'Abbās infer that the waiting period for a divorced pregnant woman is the period until she delivers. However, a divorced pregnant woman will have a longer waiting period, i.e. the waiting period for a divorced woman and a pregnant divorced woman will be taken into account and the longer one will be applicable to her. For example, if she delivers before four months and ten days, she will have to complete the prescribed waiting period of four months and ten days. However, if the delivery date extends beyond that, her waiting period will come to an end when she delivers.

'Abdullah ibn Mas'ūd maintains that this verse in Surah al- Talaq was revealed after verse 234 of the same Sūrah, hence the last injunction has made the earlier one applicable to the non-pregnant widow, fixing her waiting period to when her delivery happens, whether she is divorced or widowed. According to this ruling, a pregnant woman's waiting period is over as soon as she delivers whether it is immediately after her husband's death or it takes longer than four months and ten days. This opinion is supported by the report of Ubayy Ibn Ka'b who said: "When this verse of Surah al-Talaq was revealed, I asked the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): 'Is it for both the divorced woman and the widow?' And he replied in the affirmative." Another report adds that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) clarified: "The waiting period for every pregnant woman is until she delivers" (Ibn Jarīr and Ibn Abī Ḥātim). Ibn Hajar further points to some flaw in the chain of narrators of this report. However, since it has been reported by several chains of transmitters, one has to admit that it must have some basis. More importantly, the above opinion is reinforced by the following incident related to Subay‘ah al-Aslamiyyah which occurred during the time of the Prophet. She became a widow while pregnant and later delivered her baby - according to some traditions, twenty, twenty- three, twenty-five, thirty-five or forty days after her husband's death (various reports have mentioned these different number of days). When she delivered her baby, the Prophet's ruling was sought and he gave her permission to re-marry. This same incident has been narrated by al-Bukhārī and Muslim on the basis of various chains from Umm Salamah. And it has also been narrated by al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Imām Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd, al-Nasā ́ī and Ibn Majah through various chains of transmission, on the authority of al-Miswar ibn Makhramah.

Muslim has narrated Subay 'ah al-Aslamiyyah's version as follows: "I was the wife of Sa'd ibn Khawlah. I was pregnant when my husband died at the time of the Prophet's farewell pilgrimage. I delivered my baby a few days after my husband's death. Someone told me that I could not marry before the expiry of four months and ten days. I went to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and asked his opinion. He replied: 'You have become lawful for anyone [to marry you] as soon as you delivered your baby. You can re-marry now if you wish."" This tradition has been related by al-Bukhārī too but his narration is brief.

This same opinion has been reported from a large number of Companions (ṣaḥābah). Imām Mālik, Imām al-Shāfi ‘ī, ‘Abd al-Razzāq ibn Abi Shaybah and Ibn al-Mundhir have narrated the following report: "When 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar was asked concerning a pregnant widow, he replied that her waiting period is the period until the birth of her child. Then, a man from the Anṣār confirmed this, saying: ''Umar had said that when a wife delivers her baby she becomes pure and lawful for re-marriage even if her deceased husband is not yet buried." This opinion was endorsed by Abū Hurayrah, Abū Mas‘ūd al-Badrī and 'A'ishah. The same opinion has also been adopted by the Imāms of the four Sunni schools as well as other leading jurists.

The Shafi'is maintain that if the pregnant woman has more than one child in her womb, the waiting period will come to an end at the delivery of the last child. Even if a woman has a still birth, her delivery will mark the end of her waiting period. In the case of abortion, if the midwives on the basis of their knowledge and experience point out that it is a complete foetus, and not a lump of flesh, their ruling would be accepted and her waiting period will be over (Mughnī al-Muḥtāj). The opinion of the Ḥanbalis and Ḥanafis is also very close to this. But, in the case of abortion, their opinion is that, unless the human form is clearly visible, the midwives statment that it is a human embryo will not be trusted and this will not bring the waiting period to an end (Badā'i' al-Ṣanā'i' and al-Inṣāf). However, in modern times, this can easily be ascertained with the help of a medical investigation whether the aborted foetus has a human shape, or it is a kind of tumour or congealed blood. And the waiting period will be decided accordingly. If such medical diagnosis is not available, it is preferable to abide by the Ḥanbali and Ḥanafi stance. One should not go by the opinion of some ignorant midwives regarding the abortion and status of the foetus.

15. Although this is a general exhortation which applies to the governance of all the conditions of human life, yet in this particular context the object is to warn the Muslims. They are asked to abide by the above-mentioned commands and obey them while fearing God regardless of the responsibility they may have to shoulder as a consequence. For then God will facilitate things for them, forgive their sins and grant them a tremendous reward in the Hereafter. It goes without saying that the prescribed period of some divorced women is three months. Their waiting period does not exceed this for those whose term is fixed at three monthly cycles while that of the pregnant woman may be extended to several months. People may find it hard to shoulder the responsibility of such a woman's maintenance and accommodation, especially when the man may have decided to sever his ties with her. However, God's promise is that He will lighten the burden of the one who bears it in fear of Him and in following His Command by His special bounty and grace, and will reward him much more generously in comparison to the small burden borne by him in this world.

16. All jurists are agreed that if the woman is divorced revocably, the husband is obliged to bear the expenses of her maintenance and accommodation. There is also unanimity that if the divorced woman is pregnant, the husband bears the expenses of her maintenance and accommodation untill her child is delivered whether the divorce is revocable or irrevocable. The jurists, however, disagree between them about whether the non-pregnant woman (muṭallaqah mabtūtah) who has been divorced irrevocably is entitled to both maintenance and accommodation, or to just accommodation, or to none.

Some jurists are of the opinion that she is entitled to both accommodation and maintenance. Among these are 'Umar, 'Abdullāh ibn Mas'ud, 'Ali ibn al-Ḥusayn (Imām Zayn al-‘Ābidīn), Qāḍī Shurayḥ and Ibrahim al-Nakha ĩ. This same opinion is shared by the Ḥanafis, Imām Sufyān al-Thawrī and al-Ḥasan ibn Ṣāliḥ. This is also supported by a ḥadīth narrated by al-Daraquṭnī in which Jābir ibn 'Abdullāh related that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "A woman who is divorced a triple divorce is entitled to maintenance and accommodation during her waiting period” (al-Nasā'ī, Kitāb al-ȚṬalāq,7 and Musnad Ahmad, 41206). This is further supported by the tradition in which 'Umar turned down Fatimah bint Qays's version, saying: "We cannot abandon the Book of our Lord and the Sunnah of our Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) on the word of a woman." This indicates that 'Umar knew well this Prophetic statement that such a woman is entitled to both maintenance and accommodation. Furthermore, a tradition related by Ibrāhīm al-Nakha ‘ī clarifies: "While turning down Fățimah bint Qays's version, 'Umar said: 'I heard the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) affirming that such a woman is entitled to both maintenance and accommodation."" While discussing this issue at length in his Aḥkām al-Qur'ān, the first argument that Imām Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ presents in support of his stance is that God explicitly said that "women will be divorced for their prescribed waiting period". This Divine Command also applies to the person who takes his wife in wedlock after divorcing her twice and is only left with one more divorce. His second argument is that, while instructing about divorce, he states: "When a person divorces his wife while she is in a state of purity during which he has had no sexual intercourse with her, or divorces her when her pregnancy is well established, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) did not draw any distinction between the first, second or final pronouncement of divorce. Therefore, the Divine Command 'Lodge them (during the waiting period) where you yourselves live' is relevant to every form of divorce." His third argument is: "The husband is obliged to provide both maintenance and accommodation for the woman, whether she is pregnant or not and whether the divorce is revocable or irrevocable. It also holds true for the non-pregnant woman who is divorced a revocable divorce. This shows that maintenance and lodging have not been made incumbent because of pregnancy but because both are legally bound to stay in the husband's house. According to Islamic law, both women have to live at the husband's home. Now, if the same ruling is also applicable to the non-pregnant woman who is divorced an irrevocable divorce, there is no reason why her lodging and maintenance should not be incumbent on the man divorcing her. The husband still owes maintenance and accommodation to his non-pregnant wife whom he has divorced a triple divorce.

However, some jurists are of the opinion that the woman who is irrevocably divorced (mubtütah) has a right only to accommodation, not maintenance. This opinion is held by Sa'id ibn al-Mussayyib, Sulayman ibn Yasar, 'Aṭā' al-Sha'bi, al-Awzãi, al-Layth and Abū 'Ubayd (may Allah bless them all). Imam al-Shafi'i and Imām Mālik agree with the above opinion. However, in Mughnī al-Muḥtāj, Imām al-Shāfi‘ī has a different opinion than that of 'Umar which is discussed below.

Another group of jurists insists that the woman who is irrevocably divorced (muṭallaqah mubtütah) is neither entitled to maintenance nor accommodation. This ruling is upheld by al-Hasan al-Baṣrī, Ḥammād, Ibn Abi Layla, 'Amr ibn Dīnār, Tawūs, Ishaq ibn Rahawayh and Abū Thawr. According to Ibn Jarir, the same opinion was upheld by Ibn 'Abbās. Imām Ahmad ibn Hanbal and the Imāmiyyah, one of the the Shi'ah groups, subscribe to this opinion too. The Shāfi 'ī stance as recorded in Mughnī al-Muḥtāj is as follows: "A woman in her waiting period after a divorce is entitled to accommodation, whether she is pregnant or not. However, this ruling does not apply to the woman who is irrevocably divorced (ba'inah). The non-pregnant woman who is irrevocably divorced is not entitled to maintenance or lodging. They infer the above ruling from the Qur'ānic verse saying: "you do not know may be God will cause something to happen to pave the way (for reconciliation)" (Surah al-Talaq 65:1). For them, the above holds true only for the woman who is revocably divorced (muṭallaqah ṭalāq raji), but not for the woman who is irrevocably divorced (mubtūtah). Hence, accommodation should be provided only to the women whose divorce is revocable (raj '7). The second argument for their opinion is the ḥadīth of Fatimah bint Qays which is narrated through a large number of chains of transmission.

Fatimah bint Qays al-Fihriyyah was one of the earliest migrants to Madīnah and was widely acclaimed for her sagacity. The group of Prophetic Companions who constituted the advisory council (Shūrā) to discuss 'Umar's martyrdom was held at her house. Fățimah was first married to Abū 'Amr ibn Hafs ibn al-Mughīrah al-Makhzūmī who separated from her through divorcing her a triple divorce.

It was then that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) arranged her marriage to Usāmah ibn Zayd. Her story goes like this: Fatimah's husband, Abū 'Amr, had divorced her twice. When he was deputed along with 'Ali to Yemen, he pronounced the third and final irrevocable divorce. Some reports indicate that Abū 'Amr had sent word to his relatives to lodge her in the house during the waiting period and bear the expenses of her maintenance and accommodation. Some reports suggest that Fățimah herself had laid claim to maintenance and accommodation from them. Whatever be the case, her husband's relatives refused to accept her demand. It was then that she approached the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) who pronounced this ruling: "There is neither maintenance nor accommodation for you." Another report states that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "The husband is obliged to arrange for the maintenance and accommodation of the woman when he still enjoys the right to take her back in wedlock. When he does not have such right, she is neither entitled to maintenance nor accommodation" (Musnad of Imām Aḥmad, 6, 372 and 417). Al- Ṭabarānī and al-Nasā ́ī have also narrated an identical report whose concluding words are: "There is no maintenance and accommodation for her if she is not lawful for her former husband until she marries another man." After pronouncing this ruling, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) directed her initially to spend her waiting period at Umm Sharīk's house but later told her to stay in the house of Ibn Umm Maktum. However, the scholars who have not accepted the above ḥadīth have the following arguments:

1. In the first place, she had been asked to leave the house of her husband's relatives because she had a sharp tongue and they were fed up with her bad temper. Sa 'īd ibn al-Mussayyib maintains: "By narrating this report Fățimah has caused mischief for people. The truth is that she had a sharp tongue and was impudent and that is why she was lodged in the house of Ibn Umm Maktūm” (Abū Dāwūd). In another report Sa'id ibn al Mussayyib said: "She had misbehaved with her husband and his relatives. This is why she was commanded to move to another house" (al-Jaṣṣāṣ). Sulaymān ibn Yasār is of the view that her expulsion from the house was on account of her bad temper (Abū Dāwūd).

2. Her narration was rejected by 'Umar at a time when there were many Companions still living and this matter could be fully examined. Ibrāhīm al-Nakha 'ī points out that when 'Umar received Fatimah's version, he said: "We cannot disregard a verse of the Book of God and the saying of the Messenger of Allah for a woman's statement. She seems to have misconstrued something. I have myself heard the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) saying that the woman who has been divorced irrevocably (mabtūtah) is entitled to both lodging and maintenance" (al-Jaṣṣāṣ). Abū Ishaq reported: "I was sitting beside Aswad ibn Yazid in the mosque of Küfah when al-Sha'bi mentioned Fatimah bint Qays's report. Upon this, Aswad threw pebbles at al-Sha 'bi, saying: 'When this report came to 'Umar's knowledge, he declared: "We cannot disregard Allah's Book and our Prophet's Sunnah for a woman's words, not knowing whether she has remembered or forgotten. The woman has a right to maintenance and accommodation, for God commands: 'Do not turn them out of their homes' (Surah al-Talaq 65: 1)"''". (This tradition has been reported in the Ḥadīth collections of Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, al-Tirmidhi and al-Nasa'i with some difference in wording).

3. A controversy erupted in respect of an irrevocably divorced woman during Marwan's reign. 'A'ishah severely criticised Fatimah bint Qays's report. Qāsim ibn Muḥammad says: "I asked the lady 'A'ishah: 'Did you know the incident concerning Fatimah?' To this she replied: 'It is better that you do not mention Fatimah"" (al-Bukhārī). Al-Bukhārī has narrated a variant report in which 'A'ishah says: "What has happened to Fatimah? Does she not fear God?" In yet another narration, 'Urwah ibn al- Zubayr states that 'Ã'ishah said: "There is no good for Fatimah in reporting this ḥadīth." And in another report, 'Urwah says that 'A'ishah expressed her great indignation at Fāṭimah, saying: "Actually she was in an empty house where she had no sympathizer therefore, for the sake of her convenience, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) directed her to change the house."

4. Fățimah later married Usāmah ibn Zayd. Muḥammad ibn Usamah reports: "Whenever Fatimah mentioned that ḥadīth, my father threw at her whatever he could lay his hands on" (al- Jaṣṣās), for since Usamah knew that what Fatimah said is contrary to the Sunnah, he could not but feel so annoyed at the mention of this ḥadīth.

17. There is a scholarly consensus that the husband is responsible for the maintenance and accommodation of his divorced pregnant wife until she delivers, whether she has been divorced a revocable or irrevocable divorce. Their disagreement is on whether this applies to the divorced pregnant woman whose husband dies, whether he dies after divorcing her or she becomes a widow while pregnant without being divorced. In this regard, the jurists have expressed the following opinion:

1. 'Ali and 'Abdullah ibn Mas'ud were of the opinion that she has an obligated right to maintenance from the husband's undivided inheritance. This view is endorsed by 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar, Qāḍī Shurayḥ, Abu'l-‘Āliyah, al-Sha‘bī and Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī. A report ascribes the same opinion to 'Abdullah ibn 'Abbās (al- Älūsi and al-Jaṣṣās).

2. Ibn Jarir narrates the following report from 'Abdullah ibn 'Abbās: "If the deceased person has left behind some inheritance, she should be supported out of the share of the child in her womb; and if he has left no inheritance, the heirs of the deceased should spend on her. Allah says: (And the same responsibility for the maintenance of the mother devolves upon the heir) (verse 233 of Surah al-Baqarah)."

3. According to Jābir ibn 'Abdullāh, ‘Abdullāh ibn al-Zubayr, al- Hasan al-Baṣrī, Sa 'īd ibn al-Musayyib and ‘Aṭā' ibn Abī Rabāḥ, there is no maintenance for her out of her deceased husband's inheritance. A third saying from ‘Abdullāh ibn 'Abbas also has been narrated which conveys the same opinion (al-Jaṣṣāṣ). What is meant is that she can meet her expenses from the share of inheritance that she may receive from her husband's legacy, but she has no right of inheritance in the husband's combined legacy as this may put a burden on the other heirs.

4. Ibn Abi Laylā maintains that "her maintenance from the deceased husband's inheritance is as obligatory as the payment of somebody's debt is obligatory from his inheritance" (al-Jaṣṣāṣ). In other words, just as a debt has to be paid out of the combined inheritance, so should her maintenance be paid out of it. 5. Imām Abū Ḥanīfah, Imām Abū Yūsuf, Imām Muḥammad and Imām Zufar maintain that she has neither any right to accommodation out of her deceased husband's inheritance nor to maintenance, as nothing belongs to the deceased after death and whatever he leaves belongs to his heirs. The widowed pregnant woman, therefore, cannot have any maintenance out of their property (al-Hidayah and al-Jaṣṣāṣ). Imām Aḥmad ibn Hanbal shares the same opinion (al-Inṣāf). 6. Imam al-Shafi'i also believes that she does not have any claim to maintenance even though she has a right to accommodation (Mughni al-Muḥtāj). He infers this from the following incident involving Abū Sa ‘īd al-Khudri's sister, Furay'ah bint Mālik. When her husband was put to death, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) commanded her to spend her waiting period in the house of her husband (Abū Dāwūd, Kitāb al-Ṭalāq, 190, al-Nasa'ī, Kitāb al-Ṭalāq, 20 and al-Tirmidhi, Kitāb al-Ṭalāq, 5). Moreover, they deduce their view from the tradition narrated by al-Dāraquṭnī in which the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "There is no maintenance for a widowed pregnant woman." Imām Mālik also upholds the same opinion (Ḥāshiyat al-Dasūqī).

18. These salient points emerge from the Divine Command:

1. The woman is the owner of her milk, otherwise she would not have been entitled to charge for it.

2. As soon as she becomes free from the marriage contract with her previous husband upon the birth of her child, she is not legally bound to nurse her baby. But if the baby's father wants her to nurse it and she agrees, she is entitled to receive a wage for doing so.

3. The baby's father is also not under any legal obligation to have the baby suckled just by its mother.

4. The baby's father is responsible for all the expenses involved in the maintenance of the baby.

5. The mother of the baby has the right to feed her baby before anyone else. If she is not willing to do so, arrangement may be made for a foster mother, and she may ask for an exorbitant wage which is beyond the father's means.

6. The sixth ruling that automatically follows from the above is that, if the foster mother asks for the same wage as that asked for by the mother, the mother's right will be given precedence.

The following are the opinions of the Jurists on this issue: Al-Daḥḥāk says, "The baby's mother has greater claim to feed it. However, it is up to her whether or not she wants to feed her baby. However, if the baby does not accept milk from any foster mother, the real mother will be obliged to suckle the baby." An almost similar opinion is held by Qatādah, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhai and Sufyan al-Thawrī. Ibrāhim al-Nakha ‘ī also adds: "If a foster mother is not available to nurse the baby, the mother will be compelled to nurse it" (Ibn Jarīr).

According to al-Hidayah: "If the child has not yet been weaned at the separation of the parents, it is not obligatory for the mother to feed it. However, if a foster mother is not available, the mother will be compelled to suckle her child. And if the father finds a foster mother who asks for the same wages as that asked for by the mother, or if the latter is ready to feed without any wages, the mother will be given precedence. However, if the baby's mother asks for a higher wage than that asked for by a foster mother, the father is not obliged to accept her demand.

19. This contains a severe rebuke for both the father and mother. It is clear from the context that God dislikes the fact that the two do not settle amicably the question of their child's suckling and fail to overlook the bitterness that led to their divorce. The woman has been warned that, if she demands higher wages in order to embarrass her former husband, a foster mother can be found to nurse the baby. The husband is also cautioned that it would be unfair to press the mother unjustly just because she is the mother of the baby, and doing so betrays his misconduct. Almost the same point is explained more explicitly in verse 233 of Surah al-Baqarah.

20. The Muslims are warned that, if they violate the commands given to them through the Messenger of God and His Book, they will meet a difficult fate in this world as well as in the Hereafter. By the same token, they will receive a huge reward if they obey them.

21. Some Qur'anic commentators understand by dhikr (admonition) the Qur'an itself and by the Messenger, Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him). Others maintain that "dhikr" refers to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) himself for he was the embodiment of admonition to the people. In our opinion, the second interpretation is more plausible. The Qur'ānic text clearly means that God has sent down an admonition which is embodied by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). Obviously there is no need for an interpolation in the Qur'ānic text when the meaning is perfectly clear.

22. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) has led people from the darkness of ignorance to the light of knowledge. One realises the full significance of the Qur'ānic Divine Saying when one makes a comparative study of various ancient and modern family laws of the world pertaining to divorce, the waiting period and provision of maintenance. Such a comparative study convinces one that, in spite of unending amendments and modifications, no nation has been able so far to enact such a natural, logical and socially useful law which the Qur'ān and Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) have given some one and half thousand years ago. This law has never stood in need of revision nor will it ever require it in the future. Constraints of space prevent us from presenting this comparative study. However, a brief comparative account features in the conclusion of our Urdu book Huquq al-Zawjayn (The Rights of Spouses). Nonetheless, those endowed with knowledge may note the glaring difference by comparing Islamic law, which is based on the Qur'ān and Sunnah, with other religious and secular laws prevalent in the world.

23. The expression "like them" does not mean that God has created the same number of earths as He has created several heavens. What it really means is that, in the same way God has created several earths, He has also created several heavens. Here, the words "like them" and "the earth" are used for a purpose. God has made the earth as a bed and cradle. By the same token, God has prepared the other earths in the universe to serve the same function: to provide a bed and cradle to the creatures living on them. At places, the Qur'ān hints at the presence of living creatures, not just on earth but also in heaven (for further details, see: Tafhim al-Qur'ān, vol. 4, Surah al-Shūrā 42: 29, n. 50). In other words, the countless stars and planets in the sky are not all desolate but, like the earth, there are many among them which are inhabited.

Among the earliest Qur'ānic commentators, Ibn 'Abbās holds the distinction of being the first Qur'ānic commentator of his day to express this truth which was not known at that time. It was beyond man's imagination that some rational creatures could exist outside earth. Even the scientists of today are still sceptical about this possibility. Those living some 1400 years ago could not buy this story at all. That is why Ibn 'Abbas felt hesitant to state this truth before the common people for he feared it would shake their faith. Mujāhid informs: "When Ibn 'Abbās was asked to explain the meaning of this Qur'ānic verse, he replied: 'Were I to interpret it for you, you will turn into disbelievers. Your rejection of this will constitute your disbelief.'” Sa 'īd ibn Jubayr has reported almost the same thing, relating that Ibn 'Abbas said: "What is the guarantee that you will not turn into unbelievers if I interpret it for you?" (Ibn Jarir and 'Abd ibn Humayd). However, Ibn Jarir, Ibn Abī Ḥātim, al-Ḥākim, and al-Bayhaqī in "Kitāb al-Asmā' wa'l-Ṣifāt” have narrated on the authority of Abu'l-Duḥā different words from Ibn 'Abbas regarding the commentary of this verse: "There is a Prophet in each of these earths like your Prophet and an Adam like your Adam and a Noah like your Noah and an Ibrāhīm like your Ibrāhīm and a ‘Īsā like your 'Isā." This tradition has been narrated by Ibn Hajar in Fath al-Bārī, and by Ibn Kathir in his Tafsir. According to Imām al-Dhahabi, the chain of narrators of this tradition is sound, adding: "To the best of my knowledge no one other than Abū'l-Duḥā has related this report. Therefore, it is completely an uncommon and odd tradition (shādhdh)." Other scholars dismiss the above narration as a fabricated lie. In his al- Mawḍū‘āt al-Kabir (p.19), Mullā ‘Ali al-Qārī states that this is a fabricated report, even if it is related to Ibn 'Abbās. It is based on unauthentic Israelite traditions. Its general misconception actually accounts for its rejection and people found it beyond their comprehension. Otherwise, it is not at all opposed to reason. In his Tafsir, al-Ālūsī declares that there is no intellectual or religious objection to accepting this narration as correct. What it means is that there are creatures in every earth which return to their origin just as mankind in our earth turns to Adam; and in every earth, there are individuals who are distinguished from others on their earths just as Prophets Noah and Abraham (peace and blessings be upon them) are distinguished among us. Further on he adds: "It is likely that there are more than seven earths and more than seven heavens. The mention of seven does not negate the possible existence of more." To rest content with the number seven, which is an indivisible integer, does not necessarily negate other higher numbers." Regarding the Prophetic sayings that speak of the astronomical distance between heavens, which has been stated as five hundred years or so, al-Ālūsī says: "Their distance cannot be accurately measured. The Qur'ān describes different verities according to the level of intelligence of its listeners and readers."

It is worth noting that lately the Rand Corporation of America has estimated, on the basis of their observations, that just in the Galaxy to which our earth belongs, there are about 600,000,000 (six hundred million) planets with physical conditions which closely resemble those of our earth, and there is a possibility that they may also be inhabited by other living creatures (The Economist, London, 26 July 1969).